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ESCOBEDO V. ILLINOIS

The Right To Counsel During Police Interrogation
Escobedo v. Illinois'
On January 20, 1960, Danny Escobedo, a twenty-two year old of
Mexican extraction with no record of previous experience with police,
was arrested without a warrant and was interrogated for the fatal shooting of his brother-in-law. He made no statement to the police and was
released late that afternoon pursuant to a state court writ of habeas
corpus obtained by a lawyer who had been retained by Escobedo. Ten
days later, having been implicated in the shooting by co-defendant,
Di Gerlando, he was arrested along with his sister. Shortly after he
reached police headquarters his lawyer arrived and asked to see him.
The police would not allow the attorney to consult with Escobedo
since they had not completed the interrogation. Throughout the three
hour interrogation, Escobedo repeatedly asked to see his lawyer and
was given no opportunity to do so. However, he did, through an open
door, catch a glimpse of his lawyer who reportedly motioned to him
to keep silent. 2 During the interrogation, Escobedo was never advised
of his right to remain silent, and he was supposedly promised in
Spanish that he and his sister could go home and that he would not
be prosecuted if he confessed.3 Finally, after confrontation with
Di Gerlando, he admitted that he had some knowledge of the crime.
After questioning by a state's attorney whose primary function was
to "take statements," Escobedo further implicated himself in the
murder plot. The trial court received the confession over the objection of Escobedo's counsel, and defendant was convicted of murder.
On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court4 reversed the conviction on
the ground that the statement, induced by a promise of immunity from
the prosecution, was inadmissible. On rehearing, 5 the court reaffirmed
the conviction, finding that Escobedo was intelligent and fully aware
of his rights, having been advised of them by his attorney, and concluded that the presence of counsel during interrogation would unduly
hamper police activities and preclude effective police interrogation. 6
The Supreme Court, Justice Goldberg writing the majority
opiniQn,' reversed and held that:
"[W]here, as here, [1] the investigation is no longer a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus
on a particular suspect, [2] the suspect has been taken into police
custody, [3] the police carry out a process of interrogations that
1. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
2. People v. Escobedo, 28 Ill. 2d 41, 190 N.E.2d 825, 830 (1963).
3. The officer, who purportedly made the promise in Spanish, denied offering any
such assurance of immunity. 378 U.S. at 482.
4. People v. Escobedo, No. 36707, Ill. Sup. Ct., Jan. 14, 1963.
5. People v. Escobedo, 28 Ill. 2d 41, 190 N.E.2d 825 (1963).
6. Id. at 829. See also Justice Frankfurter, Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S.
568, 579-80 (1961). Contra, Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Watts v. Indiana, 338
U.S. 49, 54 (1949).
7. Concurring with Justice Goldberg were Chief Justice Warren, Justices
Brennan, Black, and Douglas.
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lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, [4] the suspect
has requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his
lawyer, [5] and the police have not effectively warned him of his
absolute constitutional right to remain silent, the accused has been
denied 'the Assistance of Counsel' in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution .... and that no statement elicited by the
police during the interrogation may be used against him at a
criminal trial." s
The Court reasoned that under these five circumstances the
adversary system begins to operate9 and that the "fact that many confessions are obtained during this period [of interrogation] points up
its critical nature as 'a stage when legal aid and advice' are surely
At this critical stage the accused must be permitted to
needed."'"
consult with his lawyer, for "the right to counsel" would indeed be
12
hollow if it began at a period when few confessions were obtained.'
In its effort to set up procedural safeguards for the criminal
defendant, the Supreme Court has previously held that the accused is
entitled to be represented by counsel in federal and state criminal
prosecutions' 3 and that counsel must be appointed if the accused is
indigent.' 4 The Court has provided for additional safeguards which
require that counsel must be appointed at a time, far enough in advance
of trial, which would enable him to prepare an adequate defense ;15 at
a time when the stage of the proceedings has become critical; when the
results of the proceedings could affect the whole trial and the accused
is in danger of irretrievably losing his rights. 6 Under Escobedo, once
the interrogation focuses upon the accused and it is for the purpose
of eliciting incriminating statements, the accused is in danger of irretrievably losing his rights.
8. 378 U.S. at 490-91.
9. Id. at 492.
10. Id. at 488.
11. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The guarantees
of the sixth amendment were made applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). The right to counsel is
also guaranteed by the constitutions of most of the states. Fellman, The Right to
Counsel Under State Law, 1955 Wis. L. Rzv. 281.
12. 378 U.S. at 488.
13. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458
(1938). See BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS (1955).
14. Gideon v. Wainwright, supra note 13. See also Turnbull, The Right to
Counsel for Indigents in State Criminal Trials, 23 MD. L. REv. 332 (1963).
15. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 59 (1932).
16. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961). The court held that arraignment
under Alabama law is a critical stage in a criminal proceeding and therefore available
defenses may be irretrievably lost, if not then and there asserted. See also White v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963). Without the advice of counsel, defendant made a
plea of guilty when arraigned at a preliminary hearing. This plea, subsequently withdrawn, was introduced in evidence at the trial. The Court held that, even though
under Maryland law defenses not raised at this time may be raised later, it was a
critical stage and the presence of counsel was necessary so that defendant might
have known of all his defenses and have pleaded intelligently. See also DeToro v.
Pepersack, 332 F.2d 341 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 909 (1964). In this
case, the court held that since, in Maryland, a preliminary hearing is not, in and of
itself, a critical stage, defendant's plea of not guilty, entered without representation
of counsel, was not prejudicial to the ensuing trial.
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The problem of protecting the defendant's constitutional rights
during interrogation has been a difficult one since little is known about
what goes on during this often secret period. 17 When the accused does
complain, his story is usually overwhelmed by the testimony of the
interrogators who deny the abuse.18 In its attempt to regulate the
activities of the police during interrogation, the Court has held confessions to be involuntary and coerced and in violation of due process
where the accused was physically beaten and burned ;19 where he was
interrogated for long periods of time without rest or natural comforts ;2"
21
or where psychological pressure was used to induce him to confess.
The mischief and abuse of the third degree should be sharply reduced
now that an accused who has requested counsel no longer can be denied
counsel at this most critical period. 2
The decision in Escobedo was based upon the recognition that
many confessions are obtained by interrogating the accused during the
period between arrest and indictment23 and that this period often
becomes the critical stage2 4 of the proceedings. Therefore the Court
extended the right to counsel to this point. The presence of counsel
during interrogation serves as a buffer between the well-supported
professional prosecuting machinery of the government, both state
and federal, and the defendant. 5 That the defendant will be fully
informed of his rights is assured by counsel's presence. The Court
stated that "[N]o system of criminal justice can, or should, survive if
it comes to depend for its continued effectiveness on the citizens' abdication through unawareness of their constitutional rights", nor
2 6 should
it fear a defendant being made aware of his rights by counsel.
17. Weisberg, Police Interrogation of Arrested Persons: A Skeptical View, in
179-80 (Sowle ed. 1962).
18. See, e.g., Miller v. Warden, Md. Pen., 338 F.2d 201, 202-03 (4th Cir. 1964).
See Smith, Public Interest and the Interests of the Accused in the Criminal Process,
32 TULANE L. Rev. 349, 354 (1958).
19. Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942). Ward was arrested without warrant,
driven for three days from county to county, was whipped and burned by an officer.
20. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944). Defendant had been held incommunicado for 36 hours, during which time without sleep or rest, he had been interrogated by relays of officers.
21. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959). After consultation with his attorney, defendant, who was accused of murder, turned himself in to the police. He was
interrogated but refused to answer questions. His request to contact his attorney was
denied. To induce him to confess the police called in a fledgling police officer, who
was also a close friend of the defendant, to play on defendant's sympathy. He told
defendant that he would lose his job if defendant did not confess.
22. See note 10 supra and accompanying text. See also Crooker v. California, 357
U.S. 433, 444 (1958) (Douglas, J., dissenting). "The mischief and abuse of the third
degree will continue as long as an accused can be denied the right to counsel at this
the most critical period of his ordeal."
23. 378 U.S. at 488. See An Historical Argument For the Right to Counsel
During Police Interrogation, 73 YALE L.J. 1000, 1048-51 (1964). In a case just prior
to Escobedo, the Court held that after indictment an accused cannot be questioned
without the presence of his counsel. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
See also The Coming of Massiah: A Demand for Absolute Right to Counsel, 52 GEo.
L.J. 825 (1964).
24. 378 U.S. at 488. "A person accused of crime needs a lawyer right after his
arrest probably more than at any time." Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 446
(1958)
(Douglas, J., dissenting). See CHAFEE, DocUMENTS ON FUNDAMENTAL
HUMAN RIGHTS, PAMPHLETS 1-3, at 541 (1951-52).
25. 378 U.S. at 488-89. See also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
26. Id. at 490.
POLICE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM
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The logical conclusion of this rationale would be that a criminal
defendant has an absolute right to counsel 27 during police interrogation,
and therefore, any admissions made to the police without the presence
of counsel should be excluded. 2 However, the majority of the Escobedo
Court would not go that far. First, it distinguished but refused to
overrule2 l Crooker v. California"° and Cicenia v. Lagay.3 ' In determining whether or not due process had been violated by the states'
denial of the request for counsel, the Court in the two cases applied the
totality of events test, that is, in light of the sum total of all the
circumstances which led to the confession, was the state's denial of
the request for counsel so prejudicial that it infected the fundamental
fairness of the trial. The Court held that Crooker's and Cicenia's confessions were voluntary32 and therefore admissibleA 3 Second, the
27. See, An HistoricalArgument For the Right to Counsel During Police Interrogation, supra note 23, cited in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488 (1964).
28. In Escobedo, Justice White, joined by Justices Clark and Stewart, dissented.
(Justice Harlan dissented in a separate opinion on the ground that Cicenia v. Lagay,
357 U.S. 504 (1958), was controlling.) Justice White said that "it would be naive
to think that the new constitutional right announced will depend upon whether the
accused has retained his own counsel . . . or has asked to consult with counsel in the
course of interrogation." Justice White found that the Court in holding - "once
the accused becomes a suspect and, presumably, is arrested, any admission made to
the police thereafter is inadmissible in evidence unless the accused has waived his
right to counsel" - has created an impenetrable barrier to any interrogation. He
concluded that the Court, in moving in the direction of barring from evidence all
admissions obtained from an individual suspected of crime, whether involuntarily made
or not, would put "us one step 'ahead' of the English judges who have had the good
sense to leave the matter a discretionary one with the trial court." 378 U.S. at 495.
29. The Court said, "In any event to the extent that Cicencia or Crooker may be
inconsistent with the principles announced today, they are not to be regarded as controlling." 378 U.S. at 492.
30. 357 U.S. 433 (1958).
In this case, defendant was a 31-year old college
graduate who had attended the first year of law school and had studied criminal law.
During the interrogation he asked to call a specific lawyer. He claimed his confession
was coerced on the basis of the denial of his request for counsel and contended that
every state denial of his request for counsel was an infringement of his constitutional
rights regardless of the circumstances of the case. The Court, by Justice Clark, held
that the coercion factor was negated by defendant's age, intelligence and education
and that defendant showed full awareness and was advised of his right to be silent.
As for defendant's other contention, Justice Clark felt that if it were sustained it
would have a devastating effect on enforcement of criminal law. Justice Douglas,
joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Black and Brennan, dissented vigorously.
31. 357 U.S. 504 (1958). The facts of this case are strikingly similar to those in
Escobedo. Defendant, on the advice of his attorney, went with his father and brother
to the police station and turned himself in. In the early afternoon, his attorney came
to the station and asked to see the defendant. He was refused. During this time,
the defendant was being interrogated and was asking to see his lawyer. He was not
allowed to see his lawyer until after he had confessed. The Court held the confession
to be admissible since there was an absence of showing of prejudice to the defendant by
the denial of counsel. In relying on Crooker, the Court said that it had "sought to
achieve a proper accommodation by considering a defendant's lack of counsel one
pertinent element in determining from all the circumstances whether a conviction was
attended by fundamental unfairness." 357 U.S. at 509. Again Justice Douglas, joined
by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Black, dissented. Brennan took no part in
the decision.
32. The test of voluntariness has been criticized as being unsuited to the adequate
protection of the right to counsel, since it fails to provide equal knowledge of and
ability to exercise the right. The Coming of Massiah: A Demand For Absolute
Right to Counsel, supra note 23, at 830.
33. The sum total of events did not approach the prejudicial stage nor did they
show defendants to have been "taken advantage of" by the state's denial of requests
for counsel. Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 440 (1958) ; Cicenia v. Lagay, 357
U.S. 504, 508 (1958).
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Escobedo Court
apparently limited the decision to the five factors84
38
of the case.
Although it does not make the right to counsel absolute, at least
the decision in Escobedo implies that the accused, if he has requested
counsel, must be given the right to consult with counsel and effectively
advised of his right to remain silent 36 once the investigative process
begins to focus upon him - generally, at the time of arrest.3 7
AFTER EsCOBEDO

38

The Escobedo decision, limited to the five circumstances,31 has
posed three basic questions: (1) When does an interrogation become
accusatory and focused upon the defendant? (2) Must the state
affirmatively advise the accused of his right to remain silent? (3)
Must the accused be advised of his right to counsel or must he specifically request the assistance of counsel?
The courts have met the problem posed by the first question by
carefully scrutinizing the facts of each case to see whether the defendant's
voluntary admission was made before he was suspected of having
committed the crime which the police were currently investigating or
whether the interrogation of the suspect about the crime was for the
40
purpose of eliciting incriminating statements. In People v. McElroy,
a New York case, defendant walked into the police station and voluntarily confessed. During interrogation defendant made no request for
counsel, and after interrogation, a written statement was given. The
court held that a substantial portion of defendant's confession was
given before the crime had been established as far as the police were
concerned. In People v. Agar,4 the same court held that the mere
arrest by a police officer of a suspect is not the commencement of a
34. Justice Goldberg said, "We only hold that when the process shifts from investigatory to accusatory - when its focus is on the accused and its purpose is to
elicit a confession - our adversary system begins to operate, and, under the circuinstances here, the accused must be permitted to consult with his lawyer." 378 U.S. at
492. (Emphasis added.)
35. Justice White, in his dissent, said, "[T]he opinion purports to be limited to
the facts of this case ..
" 378 U.S. at 495. If this were true, other facts which
might limit the decision are: (1) Defendant had previously obtained counsel who was
trying to get in touch with him. See also People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 193
N.E.2d 628 (1963), cited with approval, 378 U.S. at 486. For a discussion of the
New York case, see 52 Gno. L.J. 629 (1964).
(2) Escobedo had had no previous
police experience. See also Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). (3) A policeman had reportedly promised to release him if he would co-operate. See also Malloy
v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964). (4) He was denied access to his lawyer and was
held incommunicado from others. See also Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963).
36. One week before Escobedo was decided, the Supreme Court in Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), held the fifth amendment, which guarantees the right of a
person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak "in the unfettered exercise of his
own will, and to suffer no penalty," was applicable to the states.
37. 378 U.S. at 490.
38. Where the cases were final before Escobedo, Escobedo was held not to be
retroactive in People v. Hovnanian, 22 App. Div. 2d 686, 253 N.Y.S.2d 241 (1964)
and In re Lopez, 42 Cal. 188, 398 P.2d 380 (1965). Escobedo was held to be retroactive in Fugate v. Ellenson, 237 F. Supp. 44 (D. Neb. 1964).
39. Note 8 supra and accompanying text.
40. 43 Misc. 2d 924, 252 N.Y.S.2d 597 (Albany County Ct. 1964).
41. 44 Misc. 2d 396, 253 N.Y.S.2d 761 (Queen's County Sup. Ct. 1964). See also
People v. Livingston, 22 App. Div. 2d 650, 253 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1964). Defendant's confession was held admissible since the interrogation ceased when he requested counsel.
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judicial proceeding and does not preclude admissions taken in absence
of counsel. In a Virginia case, 42 a seventeen year old accused of rape was
being interviewed as to whether or not he should be tried as a juvenile
or an adult when he made the admission of having intercourse with
the victim. The court held the statements were admissible since the
interrogation was not for the purpose of eliciting incriminating statements. In State v. McLeod" defendant confessed while riding with
police who were looking for the hold-up gun. The court held that since
the statement was made while defendant was voluntarily aiding police
it was admissible.4 4 Threshold statements were also held admissible
where the statements were made in the field when defendants were
caught after a manhunt and while they were on route to the police
station.4 5 The court found that at the time the statements were made
the police purpose was apprehension. Also the defendants, who were
mature and experienced in police matters, were warned by the police
to remain silent, and they made no request for counsel. The decisions
by these courts raise the question of whether or not an accused's
confession of a crime unrelated to the crime about which the police
were interrogating him would be a "threshold statement" and therefore
admissible. A few courts have held that such statements would
be admissible. 6
The question of whether or not Escobedo can be read as requiring
the state to affirmatively warn the defendant of his right to remain
silent has produced conflicting answers. In an Oregon case," defendant was not informed, prior to making a confession, that he
was entitled to remain silent prior to investigation. The accused did
not request the assistance of counsel; therefore, one of the critical
facts present in the Escobedo case was absent. However, the court
refused to rule on whether such a request was necessary before an
accused could successfully contend he was deprived of his right to
counsel.4" The court did rule that the Escobedo decision requires that
an accused be effectively advised of his constitutional right to remain
silent and that if this is not affirmatively shown by the state, a confes42. Wansley v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 412, 137 S.E.2d 865 (1964). But see
People v. Anderson, 40 Cal. 257, 394 P.2d 945 (1964). Here, before and during
interrogation defendant at all times admitted he must have committed the crime but
maintained he could not remember the details. The court held that, although the
questioning by the police may have only concerned defendant's reasons for having
committed the crime, the interrogation was investigatory and accusatory.
43. 1 Ohio St. 2d 60, 203 N.E.2d 349 (1964).
44. Escobedo was also distinguished on the basis that defendant made no request
for counsel. State v. McLeod, 1 Ohio St. 2d 60, 203 N.E.2d 349, 351 (1964).
45. State v. Winsett, ... Del ... , 205 A.2d 510, 525 (1964).
46. Mitchell v. Stephens, 232 F. Supp. 497 (E.D. Ark. 1964) ; Commonwealth
v. Coyle, 415 Pa. 379, 203 A.2d 782 (1964).
47. State v. Neely, 79 Ore. 257, 395 P.2d 557 (1964). For other cases broadly
interpreting Escobedo, see Greenwill v. United States, 336 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
After arrest, FBI agents, having warned defendant of his right to silence and counsel,
questioned him in a parked car. The court held that this was a secret interrogation
and confession was inadmissible; see also State v. Dufour, ... R.I ...
, 206 A.2d
82 (1965).
48. A Florida court, in Murphy v. State, 166 So. 2d 759 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1964), reversed a conviction where the court failed to advise accused of his constitutional rights to counsel. Basing its decision on Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506
(1962), and not mentioning Escobedo, the Court held that "the failure of appellant
to request counsel does not constitute a waiver of the right." 166 So. 2d at 760.
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sion obtained without such a warning is inadmissible.49 In People v.
Hartgraves,° the Supreme Court of Illinois read Escobedo as holding
that "the refusal of a request to consult with counsel, coupled with a
failure to advise accused of his right to remain silent, amounted to a
denial of the 'assistance of Counsel'."'" In Hartgraves the court found
that the defendant had not requested counsel, and therefore, it held
that, under all of the circumstances, the failure to advise the accused
did not compel a rejection of the confession.
Whether the accused must specifically request counsel is a question
which has also been treated by the courts in divergent ways. In
Dorado v. California,2 the California Supreme Court, interpreting
Escobedo broadly, overturned a conviction because the interrogating
officer had not advised the accused of his right to remain silent and of
his right to counsel and held that a request is not a prerequisite to the
right of counsel during interrogation. In this case, the defendant, an
inmate of San Quentin prison, was accused of killing another prisoner.
He was taken to the warden's office and interrogated without having
been informed of his rights to counsel or to remain silent. The
California Supreme Court held that once the investigation focused on
the defendant, any incriminating statements given by the defendant
during interrogation to the investigating officers became inadmissible,
in the absence of counsel, by the failure of the officers to advise defendant of his right to an attorney and his right to remain silent. In
this case, defendant failed to request counsel, however the court held,
in light of Escobedo:
"We find no strength in an artificial requirement that a
defendant must specifically request counsel; the test must be a
substantive one: whether or not the point of necessary protection
for guidance of counsel has been reached.
"The defendant who does not realize his rights under the law
and who therefore does not request counsel is the very defendant
who most needs counsel....
"... The requirement for the utterance of special words of request would compel an unreliable and discriminatory formalism." 53
In People v. Agar,54 the New York Supreme Court interpreted
Escobedo as being limited to its particular facts and held that a confession is inadmissible if police have failed to warn defendant of his
right to remain silent and have denied his requests for counsel. The
court also held that the police need not warn defendant of his right to
49. State v. Neely, 79 Ore. 257, 395 P.2d 557, 561 (1964).
50. 31 Ill. 2d 375, 202 N.E.2d 33 (1964) ; see also People v. Agar, 44 Misc. 2d 396,
253 N.Y.S.2d 761 (Queens County Sup. Ct. 1964).
51. 202 N.E.2d at 35.
52. 40 Cal. 264, 394 P.2d 952 (1964), aff'd on rehearing, 42 Cal. 169, 398 P.2d
361 (1965).
53. 394 P.2d at 956-58.
54. 44 Misc. 2d 396, 253 N.Y.S.2d 761 (Queens County Sup. Ct. 1964). Defendant
challenged the admission of his confession on the grounds that the police had not
advised him of his right to counsel.
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counsel.55 However, the court added that if the police deny the request
of the lawyer of the accused to see his client, even if the accused had
not asked to confer with his lawyer, 6 a confession is inadmissible. It
will be recalled that in Escobedo the accused's lawyer had requested
permission to see him; however, Justice Goldberg did not include this
factor among the five circumstances which would make a confession
inadmissible. Thus Agar, though purporting to limit Escobedo,"7 has,
in one respect, extended it.
The Maryland cases typify the holdings of the majority of the
courts5" which have distinguished the cases before them from Escobedo
on the fact that Escobedo made a request to see his counsel, whereas
the defendants before them had made no such request. Two days after
Escobedo was handed down, the Maryland Court of Appeals,59 in
Sturgis v. Maryland,6 ° using the "sum of the circumstances" 61 test,
refused to overturn a murder conviction. In this case defendant, who
denied knowledge of the crime when arrested, confessed after four
55. 253 N.Y.S.2d at 764.
56. The court said that Escobedo, "limited to its particular facts, and without
reference to the other language in the opinion, . . . does no more than agree with
People v. Donovan, [13 N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d 628 (1963)]." In Donovan, the same
court, in a pre-Escobedo decision, held that a confession taken from the defendant, after
his attorney had requested and been denied access to him, could not be used against him.
57. The New York court in exasperation said, "It is the language in Escobedo
(pp. 485, 490-91, 492, 84 S.Ct. pp. 1762, 1764-66 [sic], however, which gives rise to
varying interpretations of what the court holds the law to be on the subject matter of
confessions." 253 N.Y.S.2d at 762.
58. Latham v. Crouse, 338 F.2d 658 (10th Cir. 1964) ; Jackson v. United States,
337 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1964) ; United States v. Ogilvie, 334 F.2d 837 (7th Cir. 1964) ;
Hayes v. United States, 236 F. Supp. 225 (E.D. Mo. 1964) ; Davidson v. United
States, 236 F. Supp. 264 (W.D. Okla. 1964) ; Mitchell v. Stephens, 232 F. Supp. 497
(E.D. Ark. 1964) ; State v. Winsett, ... Del ... , 205 A.2d 510 (1964) ; People v.
Hartgraves, 31 Ill. 2d 375, 202 N.E.2d 33 (1964); Hayden v. State, ... Ind ... ,
201 N.E.2d 329 (1964) ; Swartz v. State, 237 Md. 263, 205 A.2d 803 (1965) ; Mefford
& Blackburn v. State, 235 Md. 497, 201 A.2d 824 (1964), cert. denied, ... U.S ...
(1965) ; Sturgis v. State, 235 Md. 343, 201 A.2d 681 (1964); Bichell v. State, 235
Md. 395, 201 A.2d 800 (1964) ; Parker v. Warden, Md. Pen., 236 Md. 236, 203 A.2d
418 (1964) ; Henn v. State, 236 Md. 282, 203 A.2d 899 (1964) ; Green v. State, 236
Md. 334, 203 A. 2d 870 (1964) ; Anderson v. State, 237 Md. 45, 205 A2d 281 (1964) ;
Morford v. State, ...

Nev. ... , 395 P.2d 861 (1964) ; People v. McElroy, 44 Misc.

2d 117, 252 N.Y.S.2d 597 (1964); People v. Agar, 44 Misc. 2d 396, 253 N.Y.S.2d 761
(Queens County Sup. Ct. 1964); State v. Puckett, 95 Ohio Law Abstracts 67, 201
N.E.2d 86 (1964); McQueen v. Maxwell, 177 Ohio St. 30, 201 N.E.2d 701 (1964);
State v. McLeod, 1 Ohio St. 2d 60, 203 N.E.2d 349 (1964) ; Commonwealth v. Coyle,
415 Pa. 379, 203 A.2d 782 (1964); Commonwealth of Pa. ex rel. Remeriez v.
Maroney, 415 Pa. 534, 204 A.2d 450 (1964) ; Ward v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 564, 138
S.E.2d 293 (1964) ; Wansley v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 412, 137 S.E.2d 865 (1964).
59. The present Supreme Court's rulings on the rights of the criminally accused
have been severely criticized in Maryland. See H. V. Eney, President of the Maryland State Bar Association, Changing Concepts of Criminal Justice, The Daily Record,
Vol. 153, No. 9, pp. 2-3 (July 11, 1964). "[Tlhe principle of stare decisis crumbled
to dust from the blasts of the Warren majority on the Supreme Court." See also
W. J. O'Donnell, Report of State's Attorney's Office of Baltimore City, Jan. Term
1963 to Jan. Term 1964. "[T]he Supreme Court, in the overly liberal viewpoint of
five of its members has tended to over-emphasize the individual constitutional rights of
a defendant in a criminal case, and seem to overlook the collective constitutional rights
of society to be protected against crime and from criminals thereby creating an imbalance in favor of defendants against law enforcement." Page 5.
60. 235 Md. 343, 201 A.2d 681 (1964).
61. For Maryland cases applying the test "sum of the circumstances" to determine voluntariness, see 24 MD. L. Rtv. 217 (1964). For a discussion of right to
counsel in Maryland before Escobedo, see Turnbull, supra note 14, at 848-51.
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days in jail without a hearing or counsel. He signed a self-incriminating statement which contained a clause stating that he had been advised
of his constitutional right to remain silent. The court distinguished
this case from Escobedo since defendant did not state that he ever
requested to see an attorney or that his request was denied. In a later
case, Green v. Maryland,6 2 the court distinguished Escobedo on the
basis of these facts: Green had not previously retained counsel; he had
never requested counsel; he had enjoyed several encounters with law
officers and courts; he did not contend that there were any promises of
release if he confessed; and he was advised of his right to remain
silent.63 In Mefford v. Maryland,64 the court concluded that the
holding in Escobedo was limited to the facts and circumstances before the Supreme Court and held that a specific request for counsel
must be made by defendant and denied. Mefford and Blackburn were
jointly indicted for robbery and first degree murder committed during
robbery. Each was convicted in a separate trial. On appeal, both contended that their confessions were involuntary and, in addition, Blackburn contended that his confession was inadmissible since his request
for counsel was denied. The court examined the events (four days in
jail) that led up to Mefford's confession and found that he had given
it voluntarily. Blackburn was arrested at home at three a.m. on
April twenty-third. He was taken to the police station dressed only
in a T-shirt and pants, and after an hour of interrogation was put in
a cell which he said was cold. He testified that he was not given anything to eat, but the police said he was. Blackburn's testimony that
he asked that he be charged so he could get a lawyer was denied by
police. The court refused to hold the confessions involuntary and cited
Escobedo as limited to its facts and not contrary to Crooker or
65
Cicenia.
The court, in distinguishing Escobedo, said that Mefford
never asked or hinted to the state police that he wanted counsel and
that Blackburn did not request the assistance of counsel in connection
with the questioning by the police, but only asked them to charge him
so he could then be provided with a lawyer. 6
However, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Miller v.
Warden, Md. Pen.,67 decided after Sturgis, Green and Mefford &
Blackburn, rejected the position of the Maryland court that a specific
request for counsel be made. In this case, the defendant was convicted
by the Criminal Court of Baltimore of robbery with a dangerous
weapon. On arrest, Miller, who was inebriated, was taken to the police
station, booked and interrogated for a half hour. Miller claimed that
before and during interrogation he had requested permission to call
members of his family and an attorney whom he had previously employed to represent him in a civil case. The police denied that such
requests were made. At a subsequent period of interrogation, during
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
Police.
67.

236 Md. 334, 203 A.2d 870 (1964).
To compare the facts in Escobedo, see note 36 supra.
235 Md. 497, 201 A.2d 824 (1964), cert. denied, ... U.S. ... (1965).
235 Md. at 516-17, 201 A.2d at 833-34.
Blackburn made the same request when first arrested by the Baltimore County
235 Md. at 509.
338 F.2d 201 (4th Cir. 1964).
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which police again denied his requests for permission to make a telephone call, Miller confessed. On appeal, he challenged the admission
of the confession. The Maryland Court of Appeals6" held that even
if Miller had sought and been denied counsel, that circumstance alone,
without showing that the confession was not his free and voluntary
act, would not make his confession inadmissible. Miller then petitioned
the Federal District Court for a writ of habeas corpus in which he
contended that he was denied due process because the police refused
his requests for permission to use the telephone. The District Court,69
in a pre-Escobedo decision, found that, although the accused had asked
to use the telephone, he had made no quest for permission to call his
lawyer. The District Court held that it was not unreasonable, in view
of defendant's inebriation, for the police to postpone his right to use
the telephone until the interrogation could be completed. The Circuit
Court overruled this decision and held that if the other circumstances
in the Escobedo decision are met and "if the intent [to request counsel]
exists and he [the accused] is denied an opportunity to contact the
outside world, it is enough to bring this case within the holding in
Escobedo. . ."" However, the court in arriving at this conclusion
did "not think it necessary . ..to rely upon that decision to the full
extent of its holding according to the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
White, who read the decision to hold that it was not necessary that
the accused should have retained counsel or should have asked to
consult with counsel in the course of the interrogation."'"
CONCLUSION
Whether Escobedo holds that the "guiding hand of counsel"
during interrogation is an absolute right or whether denial by police
of accused's request for counsel and failure to warn him of his right
to remain silent renders a confession involuntary under the "totality of
the circumstances" test is not clear. Although the Court pointed to the
denial of defendant's request for counsel as the critical moment, 72 such
a request cannot be made the basis for the test of right to counsel since
it would not protect the ignorant. If request were made the basis of
the right to counsel, the defendant, confused by the arrest and interrogation, who does not explicitly demand counsel would be left unprotected.73 The Supreme Court in an earlier case said, "[W]here
the assistance of counsel is a constitutional requisite, the right to be
furnished counsel does not depend on a request." ' 74 Therefore the
68. Miller v. State, 231 Md. 158, 189 A.2d 118 (1963).
69. Miller v. Warden, Md. Pen., 223 F. Supp. 578 (D. Md. 1963).
70. Miller v. Warden, Md. Pen., 338 F.2d 201, 205 (4th Cir. 1964).
71. Id. at 204-05.
72. 378 U.S. at 479. "The critical question in this case is whether, under the circumstances, the refusal by the police to honor petitioner's request to consult with his
lawyer during the course of an interrogation constitutes a denial of 'the Assistance
of Counsel'."
73. Broeder, Wong Sun v. United States - A Study in Faith and Hope, 42
NEB. L. Riv. 483, 607 (1962).
74. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 513 (1962); see Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478, 495 (1964) (White, J., dissenting). Request is irrelevant because once the
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requirement that an accused must specifically request consultation with
counsel as a prerequisite to enforcing his constitutional rights is
clearly untenable, for in other situations the
right to counsel, once
75
established, has not depended on this factor.
Since the request for counsel factor is untenable, can the Escobedo
decision be read as requiring the presence of counsel at every arrest ?76
The decision indicates that the presence of counsel during interrogation is required to assure that defendant's rights are effectively protected, even though a warning by police of the accused's right to remain
silent and to counsel might in theory seem to afford adequate protection. 77 However, this requirement does not stipulate that a lawyer
must be stationed at every police precinct 78 or that special interrogation boards, conducted in the manner of depositions in civil suits, be
set apart from the investigative arm. 79 Nor does Escobedo establish
judges' Rules similar to those in England in 1930 which required that
a person in custody must not be questioned."
Escobedo does not
prohibit questioning once the accused has intelligently waived counsel.
It is obvious that a requirement of the presence of counsel at
every arrest would create an insurmountable problem and would seriously hamper effective police action when such action is needed. A
simple rule for the police to follow is that once persons under arrest
have been brought to the station house, they should not be questioned
regarding the facts of the offense until after appearance before a
magistrate 8 ' and appointment or retention of counsel or refusal to
right to counsel is established it must be intelligently waived. Lee v. United States,
322 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1963) ; The Supreme Court, 1963 Term, 78 HARV. L. Rtv. 143,
217-23 (1964) ; Broeder, supra note 73, at 607.
75. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) ; Pennsylvania ex rel. Herman v.
Claudy, 350 U.S. 116 (1956) ; Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
76. Justice White, dissenting, said:
"The right to counsel now not only entitles the accused to counsel's advice
and aid in preparing for trial but stands as an impenetrable barrier to any interrogation once the accused has become a suspect. From that very moment
apparently his right to counsel attaches, a rule wholly unworkable and impossible
to administer unless police cars are equipped with public defenders and undercover agents and police informants have defense counsel at their side." 378
U.S. at 496.
77. 378 U.S. at 487-90.
78. See The Coming of Massiah: A Demand for Absolute Right to Counsel, 52
GEo. L.J. 825, 848 (1964).
79. Williams, Police Interrogation Privileges and Limitations Under Foreign
Law - England, in POLICE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 185-93 (Sowle ed. 1962).
80. For a discussion of the English Judges' Rules, see Williams, op. cit. supra
note 79. The Judges have given up enforcing their own rules, because they have
proved to be an unreasonable restriction upon the activities of the police. Williams,
Questioning by the Police: Some PracticalConsiderations, 1960 CRIM. L. REv. (Eng.)
325, 331-32. The old rules are in Devlin, THI CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND
137-41 (1938). The modern rules appear in 1964 CRIM. L. Rev. (Eng.) 166-70.
81. A magistrate is not a member of the investigative and accusatory arm of the
state but is a judicial officer, usually under some supervision of the courts. He is not
under pressure to obtain confessions and convictions as are the police. The magistrate would effectively advise the accused of his rights to remain silent and to counsel
and would make sure that if the accused did waive his right, he did so with the understanding of the consequences. A record of these proceedings would be helpful to the
courts in determining if the accused intelligently waived his rights and would also
eliminate the conflicting testimony as to advising and waiver. See note 18 supra and
accompanying text.
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accept the assistance of counsel.8 2 Any plea or statement by an accused
should not be admissible unless these conditions are met. 3 To insure
that there are no long delays between arrest and presentment of the
accused before a magistrate, a rule similar to McNabb-Mallory,4
requiring presentment before a magistrate within a reasonable time
after arrest, should be made applicable to the states. Escobedo is a
move in the right direction.

82. See Acheson, United States Attorney for the District of Columbia, Memorandum to Chief Murray of the Metropolitan Police Department, Oct. 27, 1964.
83. See Brumbaugh & Ester, Indigent Accused Persons Project, Oct. 1964 (unpublished report to the Maryland Bar Association in Md. Law School Library).
However, this would not mean that "threshold statements" voluntarily made would
be inadmissible.
84. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943); Mallory v. United States,
354 U.S. 449 (1957). The McNabb-Mallory rule has never been made applicable to
the states. See Enker & Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect, 49 MINN. L. Rgv. 47, 69-91
(1964), which criticizes the Escobedo decision as obscuring certain underlying constitutional issues by the use of the right to counsel and which suggests applying
MrcNabb-Mallory to the states as an alternative.

